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Measuring immigrant integration: the case of Belgium

KAREN PHALET[1]
k.phalet@fss.uu.nl
Ercomer – ICS, Utrecht University
CISB, VU Brussels

MARC SWYNGEDOUW
marc.swyngedouw@soc.kuleuven.ac.be
ISPO, KU Leuven and KU Brussels

Abstract

Belgium, like its neighbours, has received pre- and post-war European and non-European labour immigrants and their families, whose children are forming an emerging second generation. Likewise, Belgium attracts an increasingly diverse inflow of refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and EU free movers. As a multination state, however, Belgium is also unique. Specifically, it stands out by the late and diffuse implementation of official integration policies, with considerable discrepancies in policy practices between the semi-autonomous regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. This review presents the main national data sources on the integration of immigrant communities in the 1990s, including the 1991 census and a series of special surveys. The main part of the paper discusses exemplary measures and findings pertaining to socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of immigrant integration. The analyses document contextual variation in enduring socioeconomic disadvantage, along with cultural pluralism and multiple identities in ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts. We conclude that the Belgian case has wider comparative relevance: it is demonstrated that the varying contexts of immigration *and* settlement, *and* more or less conflicted ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts, make the difference between integration and exclusion.

[1] Correspondence should be addressed to Karen Phalet, Ercomer – ICS, Faculty of Social Sciences, Utrecht University, P.O. box 80.140, NL – 3508 TC Utrecht. We are grateful to Els Witte (CISB, VU Brussels) for hosting our 'Belgian' research and to Ron Lesthaeghe and Patric Deboosere (Interface Demgraphy, VU Brussels) for helping us to access and handle Belgian data.

Immigration waves and types: facts and figures

Up to WWI, net migration flows into and out of Belgium have been negative (Lesthaeghe, 2000). At the turn of the century, emigration consisted mostly of impoverished Flemish farmers. Their main destinations, aside from Brussels as an emerging urban center and the industrial South of Belgium, were France and increasingly also the US and Canada (Caestecker, 2001; De Metsenaere, 1990; De Schaepdrijver, 1990). Similarly, early immigration into Belgium and Brussels had a strong rural component; but it also included skilled workers and traders from the neighbouring countries, as well as small groups of political refugees. Paradoxically, although the late 19th and early 20th century are known as the high times of nation building in European history, in the absence of inclusive social and political rights, national citizenship and immigrant incorporation were not an issue (Bade, 2000).

Ever since the 1920s, Belgium has known a positive migration balance (Lesthaeghe, 2000). The country attracted labour migrants (or so-called guest workers) from the neighbouring countries and from Central and Southern Europe, in particular Poland and Italy. Most immigrants were contracted by the metal and mining industries in Wallonia and in Limburg (Flanders). The economic recession of the 1930s however, put an end to the early recruitment of foreign labour. Workers were laid off in great numbers and Belgian trade unions supported legal restrictions on immigration, the institution of work permits, and the exclusion of migrant workers from unemployment benefits (Martens & Moulaert, 1985). After WWII and throughout the 1950s, immigration rates showed large annual fluctuations, reflecting the specific needs for temporary labour of the heavy industries and the ensuing stop-and-go immigration policies of the Belgian government (see Table 1).

Table 1. Growth of the foreign population in Belgium 1947 – 1997 (in thousands)

	1947 census	1961 census	1970 census	1981 census	1991 census	2001 population register	*1991 census (naturalisations included)*
foreign population	368	453	696	878	901	861	*1.202*
% total population	4.3	4.9	7.2	8.9	9.0	8.4	*12.0*

Table note. Lesthaeghe (2000; p.3-5); data sources: census data: NIS (1998); estimates including acquisition of nationality: Eggerickx et al. (1999); 01/01/2001 population register: Salt (2001).

From the 'golden sixties' onward, however, Belgian migration statistics show a large and steady intake of foreign labour (see Table 1). As in other European host countries, the massive intake of cheap migrant workers coincides with the development of the post-war welfare state, extending social rights and fair incomes to the national working classes (Deslé, 1992; Wieviorka, 1991). During the same period, Belgium extended the scope of labour recruitment to other Southern European (not only Italy but also Spain, Portugal and Greece) and non-European countries (mainly Morocco and Turkey). As it happened elsewhere in Europe, 'old' prewar immigration in Belgium had been almost exclusively white, Catholic and European. In contrast, the 'new' postwar immigration was much more diverse, with its large numbers of non-white, non-Christian manual workers from outside Europe (Lesthaeghe, 2000). At the same time, the settlement of new immigrants was spreading from the industrial belt to other urban and industrial regions in the North of the country (in and around the cities

of Antwerp, Gent and Brussels). In parallel, the employment of immigrants was no longer restricted to the heavy metal and mining industries. Increasingly, foreign workers were also contracted by employers in other industries, construction, and menial jobs (Martens & Moulaert, 1985).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the closing of the coal-mines and the rapid shrinkage of industrial labour in the south of the country marked the brutal transition to a post-industrial economy. In Belgium, the breakdown of the heavy industries was even more abrupt and less fragmented than in some other states (e.g. Germany or France). As most foreigners were employed in industrial labour, socio-economic restructuring has disproportionately affected the immigrant populations, leading to massive and enduring unemployment or withdrawal from the labour force (Lesthaeghe, 2000). Still, unlike in the 1930s and except for a short dip in 1980-1981, there was no significant turning point in immigration statistics. Instead, from the middle of the 1970s and well into the present, family reunification and family formation became the main sources of continuing immigration.

Family reunification has profoundly changed the nature of foreign populations: from temporary guest workers to residing households and minority communities. Permanent settlement and family formation gave rise to South-European, Moroccan and Turkish immigrant communities in Belgium. Today, the adult immigrant population is roughly categorised into four generations (Lesthaeghe, 2000): the pioneers are the first generation of guest workers who were contracted in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s; the intermediate or 1,5 generation are family members who joined the first generation in the late 1970s and in the 1980s; the second (or third) generation are their offspring who were born or raised in Belgium (usually including new arrivals at age six or younger); and the newcomers are mostly partners of the second generation who continue to enter through cross-border marriages. In this paper, we will use the term 'immigrants' to refer broadly to pre- and postwar, national and non-national, EU and non-EU immigrants and their descendants.

Due to the timing of successive waves and the differential fertility of immigrant families, major immigrant populations in Belgium have an atypically young age structure, as compared with the native population (Lesthaeghe, 2000). Thus, among Turkish and Moroccan adults in the 1991 Census, a majority of the second generation is under 30; the intermediate generation is still mostly under 40; and the first generation consists of a major age group over 40, a sizeable middle group in their 30's, and a minor group of newcomers in their 20's. The age distribution of Italians shows similar generational differences, with about half of the second generation under 30; and with a majority of the intermediate and first generations over 30 and 40 respectively. Hence, in comparing socio-economic attainment across communities and generations, one should take into account differential age structures (cfr. infra).

Table 2 shows the current sizes of the most numerous groups of foreign nationals in Belgium in 1991 and 1997 (cfr. Lesthaeghe, 2000: p.5). Under the heading of (predominantly) labour migration, the 1991 Census counts 240.000 Italians, 142.000 Moroccans, 85.000 Turks, and 89.000 other South-European immigrants. Taking into account naturalisations and acquisitions of the Belgian nationality following the 1984-1985 legislative changes, the sizes of Italian, Moroccan, Turkish and other South-European immigrant populations in 1991 are estimated at 297.000, 153.000, 88.000, and 98.000 respectively (Eggerickx, Kesteloot, Poulain et al., 1999). Moreover, a comparison of the 1991 Census with the 2000 population register shows a marked decline in the numbers of the major foreign populations, which is entirely due to the greatly enhanced legal acquisition of the Belgian nationality. As distinct from other post-colonial host countries, Belgium has not known a significant post-colonial immigration wave (currently estimated at 21.000; see Table 2). Most immigrants from the former colonies came in the 1980s and 1990s as part of an increasingly diversified inflow of

refugees and asylum seekers (Lesthaeghe, 2000). The other most numerous categories of foreign nationals originate from the neighbouring countries. Finally, estimates of the numbers of undocumented migrants vary widely (Council of Europe, 2001). Most likely, the regularisation campaign of the last government will add further to the increased diversity of immigrant origins in the population statistics beyond 2000.

Table 2. Sizes of the most numerous foreign populations in Belgium by national origin 1991-1997 (in thousands)

National origins / refugee status	1991 census	1997 population register	2000 population register	*1991 census (estimates incl. naturalisations)*
Italian	240	208	200	*297*
Moroccan	142	139	122	*153*
French	93	102	107	*151*
Dutch	65	81	86	*96*
Turkish	85	79	69	*88*
Spanish	51	48	n.a	*60*
German	28	33	n.a	*54*
Congo (* *incl. Rwanda and Burundi*	12	12	n.a	*21**
Refugees (all countries)	20	22	23	*24*
Asylum seekers (all)	15	12	36	*n.a.*
Total foreign population	901	912	897	*1.202*

Table note. Lesthaeghe (2000; p.5); data sources: census data NIS (1998); estimates in last column: Eggerickx et al. (1999); 01/01/2000 population register: Wanner (2001).

Integration models and policies

With the 'disappearance of work' and the emergence of a new second generation in the 1980s (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Wilson, 1987), the integration of immigrants in the host society can no longer be taken for granted (in Belgium; e.g. Foblets & Pang, 1999; Ouali & Réa, 1994; Roosens, 1998). While immigrants are increasingly oriented towards equal opportunities, rights and access to social provisions in the host society, Belgians are often reluctant to accept the increasing presence and visibility of immigrants in their midst (Billiet, Carton & Huys, 1990). Still, we have to wait until the early 1990s for issues of immigrant integration to appear finally on the political and research agenda. In comparison with other North-West-European host countries, Belgium stands out by the belated adoption and diffuse implementation of formal integration policies. Only after the electoral breakthrough of the Extreme Right in Flanders in 1991, with a campaign which successfully exploited anti-immigrant feelings (Swyngedouw, 1992), and in direct response to the highly exposed urban riots involving immigrant youth in Brussels (Phalet & Krekels, 1999), the Belgian government and parliament finally agreed on the need for national integration policies.

The formal definition of integration, as it was approved in 1991, holds a middle ground between French-style assimilationism and Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, with notably different policy practices and vocabularies in the South and North of the country (Martiniello & Swyngedouw, 1999). The common definition accentuates protection from discrimination, social inclusion and cultural adaptation in the public domain of the host

country, while allowing for (and often actively supporting) diverse ethnic cultures and identities in the private domain of family and community life. In practice, the intricate institutional architecture of Belgium as a bi-national state complicates the effective negotiation and coordination of integration policies. Typically, policymaking is bogged down by fragmentation and competition between political agenda's, actors and competences across multiple local, regional, communal, national and European levels of governance (Favell & Martiniello, 1998).

Moreover, immigrant integration in Belgian society remains incomplete in the absence of formal political rights, extending access to full citizenship and (local) voting rights to immigrants. Since the mid 1980s successive legislative changes have greatly facilitated and effectively increased the acquisition of the Belgian nationality by significant portions of the immigrant population (Jacobs, 1999). At the same time, the volatile political balance of power between national communities and political factions has – until very recently - effectively blocked the access of non-EU immigrants to local voting rights. The issue of enfranchisement is especially sensitive in the region of Brussels, where foreign nationals outnumber a national minority of Dutch-speaking Belgians (Jacobs, 2000). Paradoxically, the formal enfranchisement of EU-citizens has not significantly affected the last local elections in Belgium (Bousetta & Swyngedouw, 1999). In contrast, the number of elected council members of non-EU origin has significantly increased. Consequently, the political representation of ethnic minorities in the region of Brussels is now on a par with that of the national minority.

Statistical treatment of immigration: data sources

Until the mid 1990s, public policies and debates with regard to immigrants in Belgium have not relied on (quasi) representative statistical data sources. Admittedly, this statistical void stands in stark contrast with a relative wealth of mostly qualitative case studies, that document the plight of immigrant families and communities in Belgium (e.g. Bensalah, 1994; Dassetto, 1996; Hermans, 1995; Timmerman, 1997). Fortunately, the late 1990s have seen the publication of a series of quantitative monographs, papers and books charting the trajectories, positions and orientations of major immigrant groups. The first opportunities and efforts to generate special survey data on immigrant populations in the early 1990s were a direct consequence of the rise of the Extreme Right in Flanders and the concomitant urban unrest in Brussels. Major special surveys have focused mainly on migration histories, family formation, education and socio-economic attainment (Lesthaeghe, 1997, 2000). In addition, the EU directives and the ensuing prospect of local voting rights for non-nationals caused a new interest in the political opinions, identities and languages of immigrant minorities, especially in the region of Brussels (Janssens, 2001; Swyngedouw, Phalet & Deschouwer, 1999). This review has a narrow focus on national census data and special survey data since 1990. It leaves out mostly qualitative case studies, generally less accessible administrative data sources, and cross-national general surveys (such as the European Labour Force Survey). In the following sections we will discuss the context and nature of data generation, the conceptualisation and measurement of immigrant integration, as well as some findings on integration outcomes and orientations among immigrants in Belgium.

One primary data source is the Census,[2] from which samples of anonymised records are available for research through an agreement of the National Institute of Statistics with Interface Demography (at VU Brussels). The census data offer basic information on

[2] *1981 and 1991; the 2001 Census will be made available in the near future*

household composition and age, labour market participation and employment status, educational and occupational attainment, housing and wealth.Specifically for immigrants data are available on: length of residence, current nationality and nationality at birth, country of birth and country/countries of schooling (Eggerickx et al., 1999). The obvious advantages of the census data are its nationwide scope and large numbers, and the possibility to compare immigrant and national socio-economic attainment. But there are also severe limitations. Both record and item non-response is higher in immigrant populations than in the national population (3.4% overall record non-response; Stoop & Surkyn, 1997). More frequent language and literacy problems are one obvious explanation for it (census questionnaires are self-administered and use only national languages), the a-typical composition of immigrant populations is another (e.g. respondents with little education are over-represented). Moreover, the validity of immigrant responses to crucial questions (e.g. on education and occupation) is often dubious. In addition to language and literacy problems, some questions are not adapted to cross-border careers (e.g. educational systems in the home countries may differ from the Belgian system). Finally, the census omits crucial information that would be needed to analyse properly the emerging ethnic stratification of Belgian society. Thus, for reasons of privacy and political sensitivity, it does not include questions on language, religion, ethnic or class origins. Consequently, not only are we unable to disentangle the impact of ethnic and class origins on second-generation attainment, but also this second generation is rapidly becoming 'statistically invisible' (see Table 2).

Complementary data sources are special surveys that have specifically (over)sampled and approached immigrant minorities. The quality of data is greatly enhanced by: training co-ethnic interviewers for face-to-face personal interviewing; developing national and ethnic language versions of questionnaires; and closely tailoring questions, routings and response categories to reflect immigrant trajectories and orientations. In the 1990s, the collaborative efforts of several universities and ministries have generated a series of special surveys among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.

(a) The 1991-1993 FFVP (*Family Formation and Value Patterns*) survey covers N=1700 women of Turkish or Moroccan national origin aged 17 to 49 in Flanders and Brussels. It was carried out by the VU Brussels and RU Gent IUAP (*Inter-University Attraction Pole 'ethnic minorities')* and funded by the federal Ministry of Science, Technology and Culture (Lesthaeghe, 1997). Respondents were randomly drawn from the population registers of a stratified sample of municipalities (with N>100 Turks or Moroccans and with low, middle and high degrees of urbanisation). Non-response rates are 15% (5% refusals) for Turkish and 31% (16% refusals) for Moroccan women. Data are weighted to correct for differential non-response across municipalities. The thematic focus is on family formation (nuptiality, fertility and family structure), community building (migration, settlement and home/host country orientations), socio-economic attainment (language, education, segregation and labour market participation) and socio-cultural change (attitudes towards gender roles, child rearing, religion and modernity).

(b) The 1994-1996 MHSM (*Migration History and Social Mobility*) follow-up survey includes N=2750 men of Turkish or Moroccan national origin aged 18 and older nationwide (extending the IUAP with University of Liege; Lesthaeghe, 2000). Sampling and weighting are similar for female FFVP and male MHSM surveys. Non-response rates are 28% (11% refusals) for Turkish and 44% (17% refusals) for Moroccan men. The thematic focus of male and female surveys is largely similar, but the FFVP survey has more elaborate questions on family formation while the MHSM survey offers a more detailed reconstruction of educational and occupational careers, which includes pre-migration parental and individual ethnic and class origins.

(c) The 1997-1998 BMS (*Brussels Minorities Survey*) data cover N=1000 adult men and women of Turkish and Moroccan national origin, as well as a comparison sample of N=400 Belgian nationals, aged 18 and older in the Region of Brussels, which is the metropolitan area where most immigrants are concentrated (Swyngedouw et al., 1999). The survey was carried out by a consortium of research centers (CISB at VU Brussels, IPSOM at KU Brussels and ERCOMER at Utrecht University) and funded by the Ministry of Brussels Capital Region. Non-response rates are 20% (9% refusals) for Turkish, 26% (9% refusals) for Moroccan, and 31% (19% refusals) for Belgian nationals. Immigrant data are weighted to reflect the multivariate gender by age by education structure in the population (through iterative proportional fitting). The cross-ethnic sampling design is comparative, so that Belgian respondents are selected and weighted to match the structure of the pooled immigrant populations. Thematically, the BMS data is concerned mainly with immigrant and host attitudes towards ethnic relations, identity, language, culture and politics. In addition, a cross-national extension of the BMS involves the same minorities, comparative design and thematic questions in the city of Rotterdam (Phalet, Van Lotringen & Entzinger, 2000). In our view, combined cross-ethnic and cross-national comparisons are needed to arrive at a balanced understanding of related selection, treatment and adaptation processes, which explain more or less equal and open ethnic relations between immigrants and natives (Phalet & Örkeny, 2001).

Measuring immigrant integration: an interactive and multidimensional approach

In the political arena the term 'integration' is widely used to refer to a loose collection of policies towards immigrants and post-migration minorities. Looking across Europe, the political failure of hardline assimilationism and radical multiculturalism has resulted in a recent convergence of national vocabularies and policy models (e.g. in France, Belgium and the Netherlands) around 'integration' as the default term (Favell, 2001). Although each host country to some extent reinvents its own history of nation building, the common concept of integration denotes the redefinition of national socio-political spaces to incorporate new immigrants. Thus, integration implies the selective extension to non-nationals of legal, social, cultural and political rights and opportunities that were once the exclusive entitlements of nationals. Notably, full social and political citizenship had only recently come to include the national working classes through the development of post-war welfare states in Europe (Deslé, 1992; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001, 2002). Unfortunately, the political success of the concept of integration has not always been matched by its analytical and empirical merits in social science research. Part of the problem is precisely that key terms in the field of migration studies (such as integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, racism, ethnicity) are also used as operative tools in national policy making with regard to immigrant issues. Therefore, the term integration bundles analytic concepts together with normative notions or idealised projections of society, which are weighted with very different emotional and attitudinal valences in different groups and contexts.

Hence there is a need to explicitly define and theorise the concept of integration for the purpose of measurement and explanation across national borders. We will draw on recent reformulations of assimilation theory in debates over the 'new second generation' of non-European immigrants in the US in order to spell out a core concept and theory of integration (Alba & Nee, 1997). More precisely, we develop a qualified concept and theory of integration, which is at once interactive and multidimensional, and which incorporates

challenges from segmentationalism and transnationalism as the major competing paradigms in migration studies (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt, 1999; Portes & Zhou, 1993).

From an *interactive* perspective, the concept of integration refers to mutual interactions between (perceived) treatment and adaptation, which result in more or less harmonious or conflicted ethnic relations between immigrant and host communities (Bourhis & Bougie, 1998). Whereas host policies, institutions and societies constitute the treatment side of the integration process, differential resources, perceptions and strategies of immigrant communities make up the adaptation side of the process (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 1999). The interactive approach qualifies a deterministic notion of integration as a gradual shift towards parity/conformity with the life chances/cultural customs of the national population. Thus, 'straight line' assimilation theory in the US (Gans, 1973) predicts that the second and third generations of immigrant origin will become socio-economically and socio-culturally indistinguishable from the native population (that is after controlling for social class origins). In contrast, and in line with a more general interactive approach of immigrant integration, segmentationalists in the US have predicted second-generation progress or decline, depending on the interplay between more or less resourceful immigrant communities and more or less welcoming contexts of reception (Gans, 1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993).

Furthermore, the integration process is best conceived as *multidimensional*. Major dimensions of integration in the European context refer to distinct aspects of an ideal conception of full citizenship (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 1999). Specifically, socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of immigrant integration refer to the social, cultural and political rights of full citizens (over and above human and civil rights). The multidimensional concept of integration in European migration studies builds on Gordon's (1964) earlier conceptualisation of cultural, structural and identity dimensions of assimilation, which has been at the origin of much empirical research in the US and in Europe (Esser, 1980; Veenman, 2001). But researchers in the US and in Europe are studying different realities and have stressed distinct dimensions of assimilation or integration. Not surprisingly, given the centrality of race relations in the making of American cities, migration research in the US has emphasised structural assimilation, in the sense of ethnic and racial mixing, as a decisive branching point in the assimilation process. In Europe, migration studies have taken a more state-centered approach to integration, emphasising the political participation of immigrants as citizens in public debates and democratic institutions (Faist, 2000). Looking beyond different research traditions in the US and in Europe, assimilation and integration theories share the same theoretical expectation that distinct dimensions are functionally related (Alba & Nee, 1997). Thus, assimilation theory predicts that immigrant acculturation is associated with upward social mobility. Likewise, integration theory associates political participation with national identification (Faist, 2000). In contrast, alternative segmentationalist or transnationalist positions imply the decoupling of socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions (Bommes, 2002). More in general, a multidimensional concept and measurement of integration allows for the selective inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in different segments or institutions of the host society. Depending on their access to ethnic resources or transnational opportunities, some immigrants build successful careers without learning the language and culture, whereas others are fully acculturated yet socio-economically excluded from the host society.

Special surveys in European host countries with well-established integration policies – such as Britain (Modood, Berthoud, Lakey et al., 1997), France (Tribalat, 1995), the Netherlands (Veenman, 2001) and Germany (Weidacher, 2000) – have most often directly informed, and been informed by, national policy making. In the absence of coordinated national integration policies in Belgium however, the generation of special survey data has been dissociated from normative policy goals. One advantage of the political *impasse* in

Belgium is that research has mostly been guided by an analytical approach, operationalising the interactive and multidimensional concept of integration outlined above. In addition to educational and occupational attainment and access to social provisions, Belgian surveys have extensively covered socio-cultural and political dimensions of integration. In comparison with neighbouring countries, Belgian surveys stand out by their inclusive coverage of 'ethnic' and 'transnational' aspects of family and community building, social mobility strategies, and immigrant cultures and identities. Lastly, the cross-ethnic design of the Brussels Minorities Survey is directly informed by an interactive approach, as it compares immigrant and host orientations towards ethnic relations within the same urban context.

Socio-economic attainment: some measures and models of ethnic inequality

The socio-economic dimension of integration is broadly concerned with the social inclusion of immigrants (and nationals) in the host society. Below, we will briefly discuss selected Belgian findings on residential segregation, educational and occupational inequalities, which document the socio-economic attainment of immigrants.

Residential segregation and perceived discrimination

One type of measurement of socio-economic exclusion, which has received much attention, refers to degrees and patterns of residential segregation. In comparison with other European cities such as Amsterdam, Paris or London, the metropolitan area of Brussels is characterised by higher overall levels of ethnic segregation (Breebaart & Musterd, 1995). It should be added though that statistical sectors in Belgium are relatively fine-grained, so that segregation indices may have been inflated in comparative terms. Furthermore, they differ between immigrant communities and regional contexts of settlement (Lesthaeghe, 2000): the lack of inclusion is most pronounced for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants; less so for South-Europeans; and least for North-Europeans. Across immigrant groups, degrees of segregation are relatively high in Brussels and Flanders but much reduced in Wallonia, where immigrant settlement has been more dispersed in suburbs. Differential residential patterns are strongly related to socio-economic inequality, so that high proportions of immigrants and economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, inferior quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighbourhoods (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2000). Moreover, the perceived ethnic composition of the neighbourhood is associated with subjective perceptions of ethnic discrimination by Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Brussels. Thus, immigrants who were more ethnically segregated, also perceived more discrimination against the ethnic in-group (Derycke & Swyngedouw, 1997; Swyngedouw, Phalet & Derycke, 2001). To conclude, rather than protecting immigrants from discrimination by strengthening ethnic community ties, as predicted by ethnic competition theories, residential segregation was found to aggravate ethnic inequality and perceived discrimination.

Educational attainment

Another measure of the socio-economic dimension of integration is concerned with educational attainment. Using the 1991 Census, an inspection of the observed proportions of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. native Belgians with little or no education shows gross educational disadvantage across immigrant groups. To a significant extent, this 'ethnic' disadvantage persists in the second generation (see Table 3). To assess socio-

economic integration, the imported human capital of the first generation should be distinguished from human capital investments made in the host country. Italian as well as Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are former 'guest workers' who have entered Belgium mostly with low or no qualifications – except for a separate stream of highly qualified Moroccans who are enrolling in French-speaking universities (Neels, 2000). Importantly, first-generation immigrant women have even lower levels of education than men, reflecting large gender inequalities in the home countries, especially in rural parts of Turkey and Morocco. At the same time, second-generation women are rapidly catching up with, or sometimes even surpassing, second-generation men (see Table 3). Indeed, the overall educational progress of second-generation women stands in clear contrast with seemingly limited and uneven generational changes among immigrant men. Significant portions of the second generation, however, are still in school, so that their (more often delayed) attainment level is almost certainly underestimated (Neels, 2000). Interestingly, second-generation achievement varies simultaneously between immigrant communities *and* regions of settlement (see Table 3). Thus, the Italian second generation seems to outperform Turkish and Moroccan second generations, suggesting differential social/cultural resources (or treatment!) between 'old' European and 'new' non-European migration types. Furthermore, regions of settlement do not only differ in the 'quality' of the first-generation immigrants they attract, with Flanders receiving the least qualified immigrants, and Brussels skimming off those with higher education. But regional opportunity structures also play a decisive role in enabling generational progress. Most notably, the qualifications of Moroccan men suggest some progress in Flanders, but not in Wallonia. The latter observation should be qualified, as the first generation, which serves as a reference group, is less homogeneously disadvantaged in Wallonia than in Flanders. More fine-grained measures and analyses of educational practices and school careers would be needed to find out how regional educational disparities may contribute to ethnic inequalities within regions.

Table 3. Qualifications by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgians with primary education or none

Primary school/none	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
(% of total population)	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	24.4	28.7	30.8	27.0	27.6	27.0
Italian 1rst generation	65.1	68.1	55.0	60.7	60.4	66.1
Italian 2nd generation	38.3	44.6	55.6	51.8	30.6	29.1
Turkish 1rst generation	65.2	82.0	60.3	75.5	55.0	74.4
Turkish 2nd generation	44.6	45.3	59.4	60.6	47.0	48.3
Moroccan 1rst generation	69.7	84.9	56.0	76.4	49.6	76.7
Moroccan 2nd generation	50.5	54.7	61.7	60.2	60.4	49.3

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

Looking beyond observed disparities at the end of the road, Neels (2000) used the MHSM survey data to model the educational trajectories of young Moroccan and Turkish men while statistically correcting for truncation due to delayed attainment. From his models, it appears that the Moroccan second generation in Flanders and Brussels is making more rapid

(but also more uneven) educational progress than their Turkish peers. More precisely, the lower overall attainment levels of the Turkish immigrant community (after correction) are associated with a common 'avoid demotion' strategy of educational investment, reducing school failure and dropout at the cost of more ambitious non-vocational choices. In contrast, Moroccans in Belgium have typically favoured more risky choices for higher forms of education at the cost of more frequent school failure and dropout. The latter strategy results in generally higher (after correction), but also more unequal, levels of attainment within the Moroccan community. We conclude that major immigrant communities in Belgium are marked by persistent educational disadvantage. At the same time, census and survey data document contextual variation in educational attainment and progress across immigrant communities and host contexts. Extending an approach from segmented assimilation in the US (cfr.supra), contextual differences can be attributed to the joint impact of differential resources, local opportunity structures and 'ethnic' investment strategies.

Occupational attainment

The critical measure of socio-economic integration is undoubtedly the occupational attainment of immigrants. A number of Belgian studies have used census and survey data to analyse differential labour market participation, protection from unemployment, access to higher occupations, and self-employment. Using broad categories by national origin in the 1991 Census (Eggerickx et al., 1999), we have estimated the 'ethnic penalties' (Heath & McMahon, 1997) for the first and second generations of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (aged 18 to 50) as compared with native Belgian workers (Phalet, 2002). Our focus is on the second generation, which includes all immigrants who are born in Belgium, or who arrived at age six or younger. In comparison, the first generation is a broad reference group, which consists of the older generations, an intermediate generation, and newcomers. Technically speaking, ethnic penalties refer to the odds for immigrants (vs. Belgians) of being (a) economically active (vs. inactive), (b) unemployed (vs. employed), (c) employed in higher (vs. lower) occupations, and (d) self-employed (vs. employed). Consequently, 'net ethnic penalties' are residual ethnic disparities after controlling for differential age structures (age centered, age squared) and qualifications (tertiary, higher and lower secondary vs. primary or none). In addition, all models control for family situation (single, married, widowed or divorced), and separate models are estimated for men and women in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia. Taken together, the analyses map the varying occupational destinations of immigrant communities and generations within distinct regions of settlement. Although regions share the same federal immigration and redistributive (taxation and welfare) regimes, they differ considerably in their socio-economic opportunities and integration policies.

Economic activity. With few exceptions, immigrants are much less often economically active than native Belgians (see Table 4). In addition, the participation of Turks and Moroccans lags behind that of Italians. Overall, female participation is lower than male participation, with the largest gender gap among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. At the same time, second-generation immigrant women are more active than the first generation, in particular the younger first generation of 'imported brides' (Stoop & Booms, 1997). Conversely, second-generation men are rather less active than the first generation. On a cautionary note, second-generation inactivity is due in part to significant portions of Turks and Moroccans who stay on in school and postpone the transition to work (Neels, 2000). In general, withdrawal from the labour market has been attributed to the restructuring of post-industrial economies, which has disproportionately affected immigrant workers (cfr. supra). Mirroring regional disparities in economic opportunities, the gross reduction in economic

activity across immigrant generations is least severe in Flanders, which is on the whole more prosperous and economically active.

Table 4. Labour market participation by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of economically inactive Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. Belgians

Economically inactive (*housewife, student, disabled, retired, other; % of total population*)	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	16.3	30.5	17.4	28.8	22.1	34.3
Italian 1rst generation	18.4	51.2	14.2	35.6	14.4	49.9
Italian 2nd generation	24.0	32.8	44.9	46.7	22.0	30.9
Turkish 1rst generation	27.0	75.9	19.7	45.6	22.5	75.0
Turkish 2nd generation	37.5	43.1	47.0	50.6	42.6	52.2
Moroccan 1rst generation	15.7	82.2	21.4	65.6	26.1	71.7
Moroccan 2nd generation	41.1	62.1	58.9	62.5	61.3	60.6

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

Looking beyond marginal distributions, we have estimated net ethnic penalties on labour market participation across communities and regions (Phalet, 2002). In line with expectations from human capital theory, proportions of economically active (or available) immigrants and hosts alike increase with age and qualifications. Furthermore, marriage significantly reduces the economic activity of women. Comparing immigrants with native Belgians however, ethnic penalties mostly persist after controlling for human capital deficits (i.e. age and qualifications) and marital status. In addition, the size of net ethnic penalties varies across gender, generations, communities and regions. While they are often zero or even positive for first-generation men, they are consistently (more) negative for second-generation men. Such evidence of male generational decline in economic activity is to be qualified in light of regional differences. Only in Brussels, with its advanced urban service economy, ethnic differentials are completely reversed between generations. But also in Flanders and Wallonia, ethnic disparities have widened across generations. Most notably in Wallonia, we find a segmented pattern of male economic activity, with marked ethnic disparity for second-generation Moroccans as opposed to parity for Italians (Turks are in between). To some extent, however, the lower activity levels of Moroccans may be due to their more often prolonged school careers. Finally, for immigrant women, net ethnic penalties are generally negative and significant in the first generation, but their sizes vary greatly between ethnic communities and regions. Most importantly, net ethnic penalties on female economic activity are generally reduced in the second generation.

Unemployment risk. Turning to the active population, we find dramatic ethnic differences in gross unemployment levels, so that Turks and Moroccans in Belgium are most exposed to unemployment, Italians are less and native Belgians the least (see Table 5). Overall, women are also more unemployed than men, especially immigrant women. But second-generation immigrant women are somewhat less often unemployed. In contrast,

second-generation men are as much or more often unemployed than the first generation. Again, the loss of employment across generations coincides with economic restructuring. Accordingly, the fates of second-generation men differ between the North and the less prosperous South of the country, where native unemployment levels are also higher.

Table 5. Unemployment by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of unemployed Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. Belgians

Unemployment (*ILO definition; % of active population)*	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	04.2	14.7	09.5	15.0	10.8	23.3
Italian 1rst generation	12.9	44.4	17.7	30.2	15.9	45.3
Italian 2nd generation	14.5	43.0	17.6	24.3	15.0	38.5
Turkish 1rst generation	34.0	75.4	29.3	47.1	38.7	74.5
Turkish 2nd generation	34.8	73.5	35.1	46.5	47.4	75.9
Moroccan 1rst generation	31.4	55.2	31.6	52.5	33.7	58.6
Moroccan 2nd generation	31.3	44.4	41.0	46.6	41.5	57.3

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

In their study of young Turkish and Moroccan men, Neels and Stoop (2000) find that ethnic differences in education, age structure and settlement pattern explain only part of the dramatic ethnic gap between immigrant and national unemployment levels. Phalet (2002) has extended the analysis to include Italians and women between the ages of 18 and 50. As predicted by human capital theory, younger (hence less experienced) immigrants and hosts alike are more often unemployed. But for immigrants, higher qualifications offer only limited protection against unemployment, so that significant ethnic penalties remain after controlling for differences in human capital (i.e. age and qualifications). In contrast with gross unemployment levels, however, net ethnic penalties are mostly reduced in the second generation. Again, there is considerable contextual variation in size: they differ between immigrant communities, being larger for Turks (followed closely by Moroccans) than for Italians. But regional differences are at least as important. Paradoxically, Flanders has at the same time the lowest gross unemployment levels and the greatest ethnic disparities in unemployment risks. Apparently, Flanders is not only the most prosperous, but also the most ethnocentric region in Belgium. More fine-grained multi-level analyses of local contexts across regions would be needed to find out what economic or political factors may account for this 'Flemish exclusionism'. Possible explanations range from urban segregation and economic segmentation (e.g. the mines or the textile industry), over public ethnocentrism and the anti-immigrant attitudes of employers, to ineffective anti-discrimination policies and measures at the level of political and judicial elites. On the positive side, net ethnic penalties (not gross unemployment levels!) are less severe in Wallonia and in the region of Brussels. Finally, large gender differences in gross unemployment do not affect the pattern of net ethnic penalties, which is mostly similar for immigrant women and men.

Most studies of labour migration in the European context have focused on various aspects of exclusion at the bottom end of the stratification heap. But the evidence of ethnic exclusion into inactivity, unemployment, or low-end jobs tells us little about ethnic differences in inclusion at the higher end of the labour market. Socio-economic inclusion

refers to the employment of immigrants in non-manual work or in higher occupations (i.e. the service classes), or alternatively to successful ethnic self-employment. Thus, Neels and Stoop (2000) have demonstrated the ethnic over-representation of young Turkish and Moroccan men in unskilled work rather than skilled or non-manual work, after controlling for ethnic differences in education, age and place of residence.

Employment in higher occupations. From the marginal distribution of occupational attainment in Belgium, it appears that immigrants are dramatically under-represented in the higher occupations, especially Turks and Moroccans. Women have less access than men, yet there appears a limited but overall progress in the second generation. Again, marginal distributions show no consistent progress, and sometimes even decline, for second-generation men. In view of the younger age of the second generation however, marginal distributions can be misleading. Hence our main question: to what extent is the limited access of immigrants to higher occupations explained by their younger age or lower qualifications (Phalet, 2002)? As predicted by human capital theory, age and especially qualifications of immigrants and hosts alike greatly increase their access to higher occupations. But ethnic penalties remain significant and large for immigrant men and women across generations, although their sizes are somewhat smaller for Italians than for Turks and Moroccans, and they are most often reduced in the second generation. Interestingly, net ethnic disparities at the top end of the labour market are smaller in Flanders than in Brussels and Wallonia. For the second generation in Flanders, therefore, the excessive unemployment risk is clearly the major hurdle, whereas in Brussels and Wallonia, ethnic competition over high-end jobs may be fiercer, in particular for Moroccans and Turks.

Ethnic self-employment. A separate strand of research on socio-economic attainment is mostly qualitative and has focused on ethnic enterprise as an alternative route to upward mobility. Suffice it to say that ethnic self-employment has remained a marginal phenomenon in the Belgian context (Moors, 2000). While levels of self-employment are generally low (ranging from 0.4 to 6.9% of the active population), they vary across ethnic communities, regions and generations (Phalet, 2002). In line with human capital theory, older and more qualified immigrants and hosts alike are more often self-employed. Estimates of net ethnic penalties are mostly (but not always!) negative. The pattern reveals complex setting effects, suggesting the existence of very specific ethnic niches or enclaves, especially in the region of Brussels. It is too early to infer whether first-generation immigrants will pass on their entrepreneurship to the next generation.

In summary, major European and non-European immigrant communities in Belgium experience cumulative and enduring socio-economic disadvantage. On the basis of the 1991 Census, net ethnic disparities are dramatic and persistent across generations for various measures of socio-economic exclusion (e.g., residential segregation, school dropout, economic inactivity or unemployment). Although ethnic disparities are also mostly significant at the higher end, measures of socio-economic inclusion (e.g., in higher occupations or ethnic self-employment) differentiate more between immigrants with lower and higher qualifications and between first and second generations, in line with predictions from assimilation theories. Although it could be argued that the census measure of immigrant qualifications lacks sufficient validity (cfr. supra), more sensitive measures of educational *and* occupational careers in special surveys yield very similar findings of net ethnic disparities.

Looking beyond generally large ethnic penalties in Belgium, our analysis also shows great and often decisive contextual differences between immigrant communities and regions of settlement. Thus, the Italian community is making more progress across generations than

more recent non-European Turkish and Moroccan communities, suggesting an emerging segmented pattern of assimilation. Especially in the latter non-European communities, combined gender and regional disparities can tip the balance between second-generation progress and decline. Thus, second generation women are making more socio-economic progress than men, as they are rapidly making up for marked gender inequalities in the first generation. In addition, regional opportunity structures also differ. Thus, Flanders, with its more developed post-industrial economy, is at once more prosperous and more exclusionary than Wallonia, as it appears from dramatic ethnic disparities in spite of lower overall levels of unemployment. In contrast, Wallonia is less prosperous but also less exclusive, when immigrant and native unemployment risks are compared. At the same time, we find a segmented pattern of occupational destinations within immigrant communities, with second-generation Moroccan men faring worse than most other immigrants. Lastly, the metropolitan region of Brussels, with its most ethnically diverse and economically advanced urban service economy, shows a somewhat atypical pattern of reduced ethnic disparities in unemployment along with enhanced ethnic competition and niche formation in higher occupations and self-employment.

Ethnic relations: acculturation and social mobility strategies

In addition to the socio-economic dimension, the cultural dimension of integration has also received much attention. A central tenet of assimilation theory is the coupling of socio-economic progress with acculturation, in the narrow sense of cultural adaptation to the host society (Alba & Nee, 1997). Hence, the theory predicts a gradual shift from ethnic to host cultural orientations with increased length of residence and with higher levels of socio-economic attainment. Measures of acculturation in the Belgian context have been mainly concerned with the cultural orientations of the new second generation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Across special surveys, questionnaire measures cover such diverse topics as cultural values and norms, gender roles, partner choice, child rearing, modernity, religion, languages, media use and ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts (Lesthaeghe, 1997, 2000; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw et al., 1999). The general picture that emerges from multidimensional and multivariate analyses is reminiscent of similar findings in the US, which have been qualified as 'bumpy line' ethnicity or segmented assimilation (Gans, 1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Thus, there is converging evidence of 'multiculturalism from below', blending or alternating ethnic and host cultural values, beliefs and practices. Typically, the cultural values of immigrants differ between public and private contexts, with an emphasis on conservative family values and cultural continuity in private life (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). In addition, cultural changes are uneven across generations, gender and levels of education, so that second-generation immigrant women with higher education are the most open to alternate visions of values in the host society (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001, 2003). Finally, ethnic communities differ in the degree of cultural closure or 'resistance to acculturation'. Thus, Turkish communities in Belgium tend to maintain higher levels of cultural continuity and consensus across generations, gender and levels of education, in comparison with more fragmented and conflicted Moroccan communities (Lesthaeghe, 2000).

Immigrant and host acculturation strategies

The diverse and uneven pattern of acculturation sketched above, is best understood from an interactive approach to immigrant integration. To document the dynamic and

interactive nature of integration, we will briefly discuss the orientations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and native Belgians towards acculturation and social mobility in Brussels (using the 1997-1998 BMS data; cfr. Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). From an interactive approach, converging or diverging immigrant and host acculturation orientations result in more harmonious or more conflicted ethnic relations. To assess immigrant acculturation orientations, Turkish and Moroccan respondents were asked to what extent they want to maintain the Turkish or Moroccan heritage culture and/or to adapt to the Belgian host culture in private and in public life. In parallel, host acculturation orientations refer to the extent to which Belgian respondents want immigrants to maintain the heritage culture and/or to adapt to the host culture. Importantly, respondents gave separate ratings to maintenance and adaptation dimensions of acculturation, first in the private context of family life and next in the public contexts of school and work. Based on Berry and Sam's (1996) widely used typology of acculturation strategies, balanced preferences for culture maintenance *and* adaptation are categorised as 'integration'; alternative preferences for one-sided culture maintenance (without adaptation) or cultural adaptation (without maintenance) are labeled 'separation' or 'assimilation' respectively; and a residual category (neither maintenance nor adaptation) is called 'marginalisation'.

Table 6. Preferred acculturation orientations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels (source: 1998 BMS data).

	Separation	Integration	Assimilation	Marginalisation
Belgian hosts				
public domain	3.1%	43.0%	44.0%	9.9%
private domain	25.8%	43.3%	27.6%	3.4%
Turkish immigrants				
public domain	18.2%	61.5%	10.5%	9.8%
private domain	40.5%	50.8%	6.4%	2.4%
Moroccan immigrants				
public domain	31.1%	47.4%	17.1%	4.5%
private domain	53.7%	40.1%	4.7%	1.6%

As can be seen from Table 6 and in line with other findings (Lesthaeghe, 1997), Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Brussels opt primarily for integration in public life: in the context of school or work, they attach about as much importance to heritage and host cultures. In private life however, they prefer separation as much or more than integration. From their side, Belgian hosts are roughly equally divided between expectations of integration and assimilation in public contexts, but they are clearly in favour of integration in private contexts. When we compare immigrant and host orientations across contexts, Belgian hosts attach less importance to culture maintenance, and expect more cultural adaptation, than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. But immigrants and hosts alike make a difference between public and private contexts, so that less cultural diversity is expressed and accepted in public than in private life. In addition, acculturation orientations are most divergent, and ethnic relations most conflicted, between the most disadvantaged segments of immigrant *and* host communities. Finally, relational outcomes also differ between public and private contexts. In particular, the accommodation of immigrant cultures in school or work contexts is a potential source of ethnic conflict: many Belgian hosts, as opposed to most immigrants, do not accept cultural diversity in the public domain. In the private domain, resistance to acculturation within immigrant families is the main source of ethnic tension: most Belgian

hosts, as opposed to many immigrants, expect some degree of cultural adaptation also in private family life.

Individual and collective mobility strategies

According to assimilation theories, acculturation – in the sense of adaptation to the host culture – should be associated with upward social mobility. Along those lines, the acculturation orientations of immigrants and hosts have been associated with their social mobility orientations, namely their strategies to improve socio-economic position in the host society. Specifically, Turkish, Moroccan and Belgian respondents in Brussels were asked to pick and order individual (i.e. qualifications and hard work) and/or collective (i.e. family and community-based) strategies 'to get ahead in society' (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). Table 7 shows commonalities as well as ethnic differences in preferred mobility strategies.

Table 7. Preferred mobility strategies of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels (source: 1998 BMS data)

	Individual Mobility	Family Mobility	Ethnic Mobility
Belgian hosts			
first choice	38.5%	16.8%	3.4%
second choice	17.7%	28.9%	7.4%
Turkish immigrants			
first choice	17.8%	14.1%	17.5%
second choice	10.2%	19.7%	19.5%
Moroccan immigrants			
first choice	35.8%	15.5%	9.9%
second choice	12.5%	18.5%	18.7%

Running counter to the alleged primacy of individual mobility in modern societies, not only immigrants but also lower-class Belgians combine individual mobility with collective strategies. Specifically, family solidarity plays a significant role in the social mobility of immigrants and hosts alike. At the same time, individual mobility becomes more important, and family solidarity less important, with length of residence and higher levels of education. Interestingly, Turkish mobility strategies differ from both Belgian and Moroccan strategies. Not only do Turks prefer collective over individual mobility, but their collective strategies are also primarily community based. In line with existing evidence of cohesive Turkish communities (Lesthaeghe, 2000), many Turks in Brussels perceive individual careers as hazardous, and ethnic solidarity as a more reliable way forward. Lastly, we found that the acculturation strategies of immigrants have implications for social mobility (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). Thus, separation and integration are related to collective mobility strategies, whereas assimilation predicts individual strategy preferences. Apparently, family and community based strategies both depend on culture maintenance, although some measure of cultural adaptation may be required for successful community building. Overall, the pattern of findings offers qualified support for the expected associations between acculturation and social mobility orientations.

Political participation: identity and citizenship

In European research on immigrant integration, a distinct political dimension has been added. In particular, the political incorporation of immigrants as new citizens is central to theoretical reflection, political analysis and policy comparison with regard to immigrant integration (e.g. Bousetta, 1999; Favell, 2001; Jacobs, 1999). Yet, there is a relative scarcity of survey data and measures of the (most often informal) political participation of immigrants. A basic assumption of national integration models has been the coupling of political rights with national membership or identity. From an integration approach therefore, immigrants are expected to gradually shift from ethnic to national identities, and from home to host country oriented participation, with increasing length of residence and levels of education. Most often, however, immigrant communities extend enduring (informal) political attachments and investments across state borders. Consequently, their political identities and orientations are seen to exemplify alternative 'transnational' forms of citizenship (Faist, 2000). As a multi-nation state, Belgium is an interesting case to test the limits of national integration and the significance of transnational citizenship (Favell & Martiniello, 1998; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001). To document the political dimension of immigrant integration in Belgium, we have compared immigrant and host identities and informal participation in the context of Brussels (using the 1998 BMS data; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw,2004; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). In light of competing expectations from national vs. transnational approaches, our analysis addresses the following questions: to what extent do Turkish and Moroccan immigrants identify and participate politically across ethnic boundaries and state borders; and how similar or different are their political orientations in comparison with those of Belgian hosts?

Ethnic and national identities

In line with expectations from transnationalism, multiplicity is a defining feature of immigrant as well as host identities (see Table 8). When immigrants are given the opportunity to pick and order more than one identity category, most of them combine ethnic and national identities in the context of home and host-countries (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002).

Table 8 - Ethnic, national and other self-identities of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels (source: 1998 BMS data).

	Belgian hosts	Turkish immigrants	Moroccan immigrants
National identities in home country			
Turkish or Moroccan	6% (5%)	95% (84%)	95% (78%)
Ethnic identities in home country			
Kurdish, Assyrian or Berber	__	2% (1%)	17% (11%)
National identity in host country			
Belgian	72% (49%)	60% (8%)	44% (5%)
Regional identities in host country			
Flemish, Walloon, French- and Dutch-speaking	72% (32%)	12% (4%)	16% (4%)
Local identity in host country			
Brussels	44% (14%)	7% (2%)	15% (4%)
European identity			
European	27% (12%)	16% (4%)	17% (6%)

Table note. Proportions are cumulative percentages of first and second choices (proportions between brackets are first choices only).

In addition, sub- and supra-national levels of identification also play a role. Interestingly however, immigrant identities are far less fragmented across local, regional and European levels of identification than the identities of Belgian hosts. For Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, multiplicity is a direct consequence of enduring identifications with Turkey or Morocco. Although ethnic identities are significantly less important to more highly qualified and second-generation immigrants, they continue to be of prime importance to most Turks and Moroccans in Brussels. Overall, the evidence of multiple identities among immigrants and hosts alike lends qualified support to the notion of transnational citizenship in Brussels.

Informal political participation

A central claim of integration models, which has been challenged by transnationalists, is the coupling of national identity with political participation as complementary aspects of full citizenship in the host country. In Brussels, informal political participation was measured as the self-reported active membership of a list of ethnic (Turkish or Moroccan) and cross-ethnic (Belgian) socio-political organisations (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). The list includes political parties and trade unions, but also service organisations (e.g. school boards, free time clubs), voluntary associations (e.g. religious or neighbourhood associations) and social movement organisations (e.g. anti-racist or women's movement). In support of national integration, we find that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are more often involved in Belgian than in Turkish or Moroccan organisations. Also, the overall degree of immigrant political participation in the informal sphere does not systematically differ from that of Belgian hosts (after controlling for social-class background). Rather, the Turkish community in Brussels is more active and better organised politically than both Moroccans and Belgians. Moreover, ethnic and cross-ethnic forms of political participation are positively related. Hence, the dense network of Turkish associations in Brussels has an inclusive 'civil' rather than a narrow ethnic character.

In summary, the informal participation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants is strongly oriented towards the host country. This finding is remarkable in the absence of formal political rights for non-EU immigrants in Belgium. Taking together the findings on immigrant identities and informal participation, we find that strong and enduring ethnic identities go together well with predominantly cross-ethnic forms of participation in Belgium. Apparently, transnational identities are largely decoupled from active political participation. We conclude that national integration is still the most valid framework when it comes to the actual political participation of immigrants in Belgium.

Conclusion

This review has presented facts and figures about the migration histories and current numbers of the main immigrant groups in Belgium. Major immigrant communities are 'old' South-European (mostly Italian) and 'new' non-European (mainly Turkish and Moroccan) labour immigrants and their descendants, as well as a more recent and increasingly diverse inflow of refugees and asylum seekers. Next, we have sketched the onset of Belgian

integration policies, which coincided with urban unrest in Brussels and the rise of the Extreme Right in Flanders in the early 1990s. Over the last two decades, issues of immigrant integration have periodically reappeared on the political agenda. This sustained political interest has enabled major efforts to generate special survey data on immigrant integration in the 1990s.

From a cross-national perspective, the few Belgian data sources that are currently available for research have the comparative advantage of a relatively high quality and wide scope. Thus, the special surveys cover socio-economic, cultural as well as political aspects of the integration process, including extensive questions on 'ethnic' or 'transnational' aspects of immigrant communities, economies and cultures. Furthermore, immigrant perspectives have been contextualised (taking into account local opportunity structures) and compared to the perspectives of Belgian hosts (controlling for social class origins). But there are also severe limitations. In particular, the statistical disappearance of the second generation (due to rapidly growing numbers of naturalisations and acquisitions of the Belgian nationality) and the continuing neglect of the diversification of new immigration (with increasing numbers of asylum seekers or refugees from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Africa) are causes for concern.

As distinct from special surveys in host countries with more established national policy models, data generation in Belgium has been largely dissociated from narrow policy targets. Instead, it has been informed by an analytical approach, articulating immigrant perspectives on integration from the bottom up. Specifically, the choice of measures and comparative designs has been guided by key multidimensional and interactive features of the integration process. The multidimensional concept of integration distinguishes between socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions, and allows for (partial) dissociations between distinct dimensions. In addition, the interactive approach is aimed at explaining more or less successful immigrant trajectories as a function of ethnic community, context of settlement, and ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts.

The main aim of our discussion of empirical measures and findings in Belgium has been to highlight the comparative potential for an emerging cross-national research agenda. To this end, we have focused on central contextual and interactive features of the integration process, which have guided the design, measurement and analysis of Belgian data. The integration concept and measures have been simultaneously informed by competing approaches from assimilation vs. segmentation, and from integration vs. transnationalism, in the field of migration studies. To conclude, we will briefly summarise the main findings with regard to political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions of integration.

Measures of a political dimension of integration have taken into account transnational aspects of immigrant identities and citizenship. In line with integration theory, immigrants are mostly oriented towards political opportunities in the host country. Apparently, immigrant political participation is largely dissociated from enduring ethnic identifications with the home countries. Turning to the cultural dimension of integration, Belgian surveys have gone beyond the measurement of cultural adaptation and competence in the narrow sense. Instead, they have amply documented the multiplicity of immigrant cultural values and practices in various life domains, and the uneven character of cultural change across generational, gender and class divides within immigrant communities. While most Belgian hosts accept some degree of cultural diversity in the private domain, the public expression of ethnic cultures is revealed as a major source of ethnic tension between immigrants and hosts. At the same time, the instrumental role of ethnic cultures in supporting ethnic solidarity and overcoming ethnic disadvantage is worth mentioning. Taken together, the analyses qualify expectations of cultural assimilation or integration, and highlight often overlooked contextual and interactive aspects of acculturation.

Finally, studies of immigrant socio-economic attainment in Belgium have consistently found large unexplained ethnic disparities. Although net ethnic disparities are mostly reduced in the second generation, in line with expectations from assimilation theory, they remain significant and often quite large. As a multi-nation state, Belgium allows for crossed comparisons between immigrant communities and between semi-autonomous regions of settlement. As would be expected from segmented assimilation, the sizes of ethnic disparities show great contextual variation (after controlling for differences in human capital). Not only do ethnic community contexts matter (with the Italian community doing better than Turkish and Moroccan communities), but local contexts of settlement also make a difference. Thus, Flanders is at once more prosperous and more exclusionary towards immigrant workers than Wallonia, while Brussels exhibits its own pattern of ethnic competition and niche formation at the higher end of the labour market. More in general, simultaneous comparisons across immigrant and host communities are needed to map institutional, socio-economic and ethno-cultural sources of contextual variation in the fates of immigrants. In all, comparative findings in Belgium reveal the intricate interplay of ethnic resources and local opportunities in more or less open and equal ethnic relations.

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